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The Senator and the Citizen:
Comparing the Agendas of the U.S. Senate and Populace
Researcher: Christian Chlebowski
Mentor: Dr. Thomas Hayes
Abstract
How responsive is the United States Senate to the attitudes and beliefs of the
constituents it serves? Using data from the Cooperative Election Study and the United
States Census, as well as an investigation into Senate roll-call votes, I will examine
Senate responsiveness for the 111th through 116th Congresses.
Introduction
Public perception of the United States House of Representatives and the Senate has been
almost unilaterally pessimistic for much of the past two decades, according to Gallup, Inc, as
seen in Figure 1 below (Gallup 2019).
Fig. 1. Net Congressional Approval Rating 2000-2021 (Gallup 2019)
While there are many potential reasons for this heavy disapproval of Congress, earlier research
indicates that it is caused most directly by the legislative actions of Congress and public trust in
the institution (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Boef and
Keele 2008; Algara 2021), which suggests that constituents are, at least unconsciously, aware of
actions undertaken by Congress and are able to express their disapproval (or approval) regarding
the legislation enacted and the institution as a whole. This presents an interesting question,
however: if constituents rate Congress depending on how it is perceived to be legislating, do
congresspeople legislate according to the wants of their constituents?
This is the crux of responsiveness studies, and, while attempts at measuring
responsiveness have been conducted for over a century, this effort is frequently focused on either
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the House of Representatives or the impact of perceived partisan alignment on election
outcomes. That being said, an increasing number of researchers have begun turning their
attention to the upper chamber and focusing on responsiveness between the United States Senate
and the public.
But quantifying responsiveness is difficult– a simple comparison of overall citizen
attitudes regarding issues and related overall senatorial actions is inadequate, and indeed flawed,
for many reasons, not the least of which includes the vagaries of general public opinion polls.
For example, after the Sandy Hook tragedy in 2012, support among the United States public for
stricter laws concerning background checks for gun purchases supposedly reached 91%,
according to Gallup, Inc (Gallup 2021). One measure introduced in the Senate to implement
background checks, the Manchin-Toomey Amendment to the Safe Communities, Safe Schools
Act of 2013, however, received support from only 54% of senators, and therefore didn’t pass the
Senate (S.Amdt.715 2013). While this data may indicate that the Senate is therefore
unresponsive to constituent attitudes on this issue, such an assertion is inherently inaccurate. In
addition to the fact that the Gallup survey question is extremely generic, many other factors are
at play here that could have impacted this comparison, including partisan and lobbyist
influences, and indeed even the structure of the Senate. Further, the composite nature of the
question (i.e., results summarized of participants from the population at large as opposed to
separately by state or district) makes examining responsiveness in this example all but
impossible. Measuring responsiveness in a meaningful way, therefore, is much more difficult
than simply comparing these types of numbers.
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In order to conduct a useful study of responsiveness between the United States Senate
and the constituencies of the United States, alternative methods and more specific sources must
be identified and used, as discussed in the “Methods” section below. Before considering an
analysis of responsiveness and attempting to quantify it, however, it is important to first establish
a cohesive and overarching research question that provides a motivation and basis for this study.
Research Question
The intrinsic purpose of this research is to quantify the connection between senator and
citizen on key votes on legislation; the overall question this study aims to answer, therefore, is:
How closely do the key votes of United States senators align with the beliefs and attitudes of
constituents on major legislation (as identified by the organizers of the Cooperative Election
Study) during the 111th through 116th Congresses (January 2009 through January 2021)?
Prior to conducting the data collection and analysis procedures necessary to answer this
question, background information regarding the subject, purpose, and methodology of this study
is necessary. To provide that information, I will next provide a brief history of the United States
Senate, which establishes the reasoning for conducting a research study into responsiveness in
the chamber. I then summarize key studies in responsiveness literature, which ground the theory
I subsequently provide. Following this, I establish my hypotheses and describe my methodology,
before proceeding with hypothesis testing and a presentation of the results. This study concludes
with a discussion of both the relevance of the results and flaws and weaknesses inherent with the
approach taken, as well as recommendations for future research opportunities.
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History of the Senate
In May 1787, 55 of America’s greatest thinkers convened in Philadelphia to revisit and
revise the extremely ineffective Articles of Confederation that governed the fledgling United
States of America (The U.S. Constitution: A Reader 2012). According to the notes of James
Madison regarding the daily events of the convention, it didn’t take long before those in
attendance decided to turn their efforts from a simple revision to an outright redesign and rewrite
(Madison 1920). Under the recommendation of Virginia delegate Edmund Jennings Randolph,
on May 29, 1789, it was proposed that the legislative branch of this new Constitution be
bicameral (Madison 1920). This idea, however, led to much debate and discussion regarding two
chambers, particularly concerning the size and selection of members and the division of power
and responsibilities. In fact, Madison’s notes indicate that the convention adjourned for the
duration of June 14 for the sole purpose of developing plans for a legislative arm of the
government (Madison 1920). During this time, delegates from smaller states (many of whom
objected to a population-based legislature) were able to prepare their own proposal advocating
for equality in a unicameral legislative body (Madison 1920).
Debate regarding the “New Jersey Plan,” prepared by delegates from the smaller states,
began in earnest on June 15 (Madison 1920). The convention voted on June 19 to reject this plan
and pursue the bicameral option first suggested by Edmund Jennings Randolph. Debate on this
so-called “Virginia” plan continued through July 2 (Madison 1920) due to one major sticking
point: the composition of the Senate, which was proposed to be based on state population–
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essentially making both chambers of the Congress population-focused, and therefore potentially
harming the ability of smaller states to impact legislation. July 2 saw a deadlocked vote on this,
and the convention as a whole proceeded to establish a committee consisting of one member
from each state to craft a compromise on this issue (Madison 1920).
This divisive issue during the convention was based in the circumstances of the late 18th
century, but the arguments made by advocates of both the Virginia and New Jersey Plans have
been relevant throughout subsequent history. The Virginia Plan called for a bicameral legislature
wherein the membership of both chambers was proportionally based on population– that is, a
smaller state had fewer representatives, and vice-versa. Proponents of this plan felt that such a
plan was fair because their state’s residents contributed significantly more than less populous
states to the nation’s financial and defensive resources (U.S. Senate 2020). Opponents of this
plan argued that it would essentially allow tyranny by the larger states, who could enact
legislation benefiting themselves without regard to the smaller states. The New Jersey Plan, by
comparison, called for a unicameral legislature wherein the membership was equal by state– that
is, a small state would have the same amount of representation as a larger state. Advocates of this
plan argued that it protected the rights of everyone, especially those residing in some of the less
populous states, and that it encouraged equality among states. Opponents from larger states
argued that such an organization would allow smaller states to tyrannize larger states by enacting
policies opposed by those in more highly populated states. The final compromise, named the
“Great Compromise” was reported to the Convention on July 5 and ultimately agreed to in
mid-July; it established the Senate as a body consisting of two senators per state who would vote
“per capita” (Madison 1920). This agreement essentially highlighted and merged both arguments
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by augmenting the basics of the Virginia Plan with the equal nature of the New Jersey Plan, in
addition to other slight modifications, enabling both people and state interests to be represented
in the federal legislature, as the Senate’s equality promoted state’s interests and the House of
Representatives’ population-based distribution highlighted the people’s interests. This distinction
was further enhanced because senators were to be appointed by state legislatures as opposed to
popular elections.
With this issue resolved, the United States Senate was “formed” and officially introduced
into the United States Constitution. Its approval by the convention, however, did not mark its
creation as the body functioning today. In fact, it would take a long and arduous road for the
Senate as proposed to become the Senate as it currently exists.
The first obstacle in the pathway to the modern Senate was constitutional ratification.
Almost immediately after the Constitutional Convention adjourned sine die on September 17, the
first “anti-federalist paper” was published. Hamilton, Jay, and Madison quickly rushed to the
Constitution’s defense, and ultimately published a series of 85 letters explaining and supporting
the Constitution to the presses of New York (The U.S. Constitution: A Reader 2012). In
analyzing the Federalist Papers, there are two in particular that have special relevance to the
Senate composition argument: Federalist No. 37, Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention
in Devising a Proper Form of Government, and Federalist No. 62, The Senate. Federalist 37
argues that this compromise between House and Senate was necessary:
To the difficulties already mentioned may be added the interfering pretensions of
the larger and smaller States. We cannot err in supposing that the former would
contend for a participation in the government, fully proportioned to their superior
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wealth and importance; and that the latter would not be less tenacious of the
equality at present enjoyed by them. We may well suppose that neither side would
entirely yield to the other, and consequently that the struggle could be terminated
only by compromise. (Federalist Papers 31-40)
Publius goes on in Federalist 62 to make the case for the Senate’s equal-representation makeup
by discussing the impact on legislation, arguing that
no law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a
majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be
acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances
be injurious as well as beneficial… [however, because the larger states will
always exert control over the budget and resources, which are controlled by the
House of Representatives,] it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution
may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.
(The U.S. Constitution: A Reader 2012)
Both of these statements highlighted the nature of the Senate as a body of compromise, and
reinforced the necessity of the Senate to a general public uncertain as to whether or not they
wanted to adopt this new (form of) government.
Public Election of Senators
Of course, the Constitution was ultimately ratified, and 117 Congresses have convened
since then. The establishment of the United States Senate as our upper house based on equal
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representation of states interests prevailed through the ratification of the 17th amendment on
April 8, 1913 (The U.S. Constitution: A Reader 2012). At that time, the Senate ceased being a
chamber elected by state legislatures to represent the state’s interests and transitioned to a body
elected by the people to represent the people’s interests. Despite seeming to be a simple change
of semantics and procedure, the result of this was a fundamental alteration of the body that has
proliferated up through today. Ironically, this alteration made relevant Publius’ dismissal in
Federalist 62 of the potential downside of equal representation in the Senate, namely that a
majority of the Senate (representing a minority of the United States population) could now, in
theory, pass laws opposed by the minority of the Senate (representing a majority of the United
States population). This ability is exacerbated by the establishment of the filibuster.
The Filibuster
Simply put, a filibuster is an action taken by one or multiple senators to “prolong debate
and delay or prevent a vote on a bill, resolution, amendment, or other debatable question” (U.S.
Senate 2021a). The filibuster has existed, in some form or another, in the U.S. Senate since the
creation of the chamber. Indeed, records indicate that Pennsylvania Senator William Maclay
wrote in his diary about Virginian senators speaking for prolonged lengths of time and
preventing passage of bills in September 1789 (U.S. Senate 2021a). This tactic was quickly
termed “filibustering,” and occurred with increasing frequency during the late 18th and 19th
centuries (U.S. Senate 2021a). At the same time, the chamber was growing and becoming busier
and busier, meaning that filibusters started having more and more of an impact on the ability of
the chamber to make progress on passing bills (U.S. Senate 2021a). A particularly frustrating
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legislative session in 1915 (only two years after the 17th amendment was passed) saw an
“administrative measure related to [World War I tie up the Senate] for 33 days and [block]
passage of three major appropriations bills. [In 1917,] a 23-day, end-of-session filibuster against
the president’s proposal to arm merchant ships also failed, taking with it much other essential
legislation” (U.S. Senate 2021a). The ultimate result of these failures was a specially called
Senate session in March 1917 in which the Senate agreed to a new rule that enabled the Senate to
end debate (and allowed each senator one final hour to speak before voting) if a two-thirds
majority of senators voting agreed to the so-called “cloture motion” (U.S. Senate 2021a). This
change didn’t necessarily reduce the filibuster’s impact on the chamber, as cloture was only
invoked five times from 1917 through 1964. For the history of cloture votes, see Figure 2 below.
Fig. 2. Cloture Motions, Votes, and Invocation from 1917 – 2020 (U.S. Senate 2021a)
This failure of the cloture rule to produce a noticeable impact on legislative actions led to a
revision in 1975 to change the requirement for invocation of cloture from “two-thirds of voting
senators” to “three-fifths of all senators duly chosen and sworn” (U.S. Senate 2021a). While this
change has led to an increase in the frequency of cloture invocation (as indicated in Figure 2 by
the uptick surrounding the 94th Congress, which was in session from 1975-1976), many still
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argue that an agreement by 60 senators is too many for passing major legislation, especially in an
increasingly fractured and partisan chamber. Figure 3, below, shows the partisan composition of
the United States Senate from 1917 (when the cloture agreement was first struck) through 2020.
Fig. 3. Partisan Composition of Senate from 1917 – 2020. The majority party is on the bottom, the minority
in the middle, and any non-major party senators on top (majority party based on which party held a majority for
most of the session). The black horizontal line represents a filibuster-proof majority, and it fluctuates based on
factors such as the number of states in the Union (senators from Alaska and Hawaii were first sworn-in in 1959) and
the 1975 change from two-thirds to three-fifths required to invoke cloture. It should also be noted that from 1917
through 1975, the terminology of the cloture rule was “voting members,” which could change over time; hence the
number of Senators necessary for cloture could be lower than is depicted (U.S. Senate 2021b)
This shows that, over the past 52 sessions of Congress, in only seven of them has a party had a
filibuster-proof majority (excluding the impacts of independent senators who caucus with a
major party), with the last such occurrence happening in the 95th Congress. This has led to many
objections regarding the filibuster, and even some action against it. Most notably, after
Republicans filibustered the nomination of Patricia Millett to the District of Columbia Circuit in
2013, the Democrats used the so-called “nuclear” option to eliminate the filibuster for all
confirmations, excluding supreme court justices (Congress.gov 2013). The Republican Party
followed suit in 2017 to remove the filibuster on supreme court justices after Democrats
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filibustered Neil Gorsuch’s nomination (Congress.gov 2017). The Senate hasn’t yet taken action
to eliminate the filibuster, however, even amidst increasingly frequent calls by the public to do
so. A 1994 op-ed by Thomas Geoghegan sums up the beliefs of those (particularly Democrats)
opposed to the filibuster– beliefs that have only escalated with time:
We can’t raise our wages. We can’t get health insurance. No aid to the cities. And
why? The Senate votes it down. By a weighted vote, for small-state whites in
pickup trucks with gun racks all out there shooting these things down. We have a
Louisiana Purchase of Rotten Boroughs, full of Senators who are horse doctors, or
in rifle clubs, targeting our bills...in the Carter era, it took only forty-five or fifty
votes to pass a bill. Now it [takes] at least sixty. The filibuster, “reformed,” was
much easier to use. Everything now seems to get a filibuster, while once it had
been a rare event. (Geoghegan 1994)
This analysis of the filibuster as a way of ensuring few bills of actual significance get passed is
interesting, and came to a head in early 2021. For the first time in a little less than a decade, the
Democrats gained a majority in the chamber once President Biden took office, and his
progressive agenda was almost immediately shot down. Votes on infrastructure, voting rights,
raising the minimum wage, climate change, immigration reform, and gun safety, all parts of that
agenda, are unlikely to pass the filibuster, and, in extension, the Senate (Olson and Marsh 2021).
Even moderate proposals are at risk– for example, a vote on establishing a commission to
investigate the January 6 insurrection garnered a majority of the votes, but not a filibuster-proof
majority (Congress.gov 2021). Taken together, these seem to provide a perspective of the
filibuster as a detriment to forward progression, but there are arguments in favor of keeping it,
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including the fact that it protects the rights of the minority party. But what, exactly, is this
“minority” the filibuster supports? In theory, senators from just 21 states can torpedo legislation
requiring a cloture vote (i.e., not nominations or reconciliation bills, which cannot be
filibustered); assuming those 21 states were the smallest, theory suggests that senators
representing just 11.22% of the United States population (as counted by the 2020 Census) could
disrupt an entire legislative agenda. In practice, this is impractical, if not impossible, for the
senators representing these 21 smallest states are of varying parties. Approaching this same
question from a partisan perspective still produces interesting results. The 21 smallest states with
a unified slate of Republican senators consist of just 28.43% of the population, and the 21
smallest states with two Democratic senators consist of 39.19% of the population. This means
that, again, theoretically, Republican senators representing under one-third of the entire United
States population (and Democratic senators representing under two-fifths) could control the
legislative agenda by utilizing the filibuster. Therefore, the filibuster protects the minority that is
the small states, which are the states that the Founders strove to protect with the equal
representation nature of the Senate. Interestingly enough, however, the population difference
between the largest and the smallest state in 2020 was 57 times what it was in 1790, indicating
that the minority being protected in the Senate by both the nature of the Senate and the filibuster
is a much smaller minority than was protected when the Senate was first created (U.S. Census
Bureau 1790; U.S. Census Bureau 2020). The fact that this disparity exists and that this type of
minority control is theoretically possible reinforces the necessity of studying and understanding
it so as to consider the future of the Senate as a public institution– because the filibuster has the
12
ability to distort and reject the will of a majority of the people, it is an important factor in
determining the effectiveness of the Senate and Congress as a whole.
It is therefore the ratification of the 17th Amendment and the increased utilization of the
filibuster that provides the basis for, and establishes the importance of, responsiveness studies
such as this one. As a result of the 17 th amendment’s implementation of public elections of
senators, senators are directly responsible to their constituents, making it possible to study
responsiveness. Due to the potential impact of the filibuster on the passage of legislation
important (or unimportant) to constituencies, it is also possible (and important) to understand if
senators are aligning more with their constituents or their parties (or any other number of other
factors).
Responsiveness
Responsiveness has long been a topic of interest for political scientists and constituents
with an interest in the governmental process, as indicated by the existence of studies from as far
back as 1895 using rudimentary methods to quantify this connection between congressperson
and constituent (Moffett 1895), but the very first example of analyzing responsiveness with
regards to the Senate predates the Constitution itself. Before the final vote on the compromise
that established the Senate as a body representing states equally, delegate James Wilson stated
that “our Constituents had they voted as their representatives did, would have stood as 2/3 agst.
the equality [of the Senate], and 1/3 only in favor of it. This fact would ere long be known, and it
will appear that this fundamental point has been carried by 1/3 agst. 2/3” (Farrand 1966). He
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blamed this on the voting structure of the convention, which was one vote per state– a decently
close parallel to the ultimate structure of the Senate, with two votes per state. This scenario
reinforces the importance of responsiveness studies by emphasizing the nature of our
constitutional representative democracy, being that “we the people” elect representatives, who
follow the Constitution in making laws and governing “we the people.” Additionally, this
example introduces the value of analyzing historical responsiveness studies and understanding
the position of the current academic discussion regarding responsiveness prior to conducting a
new study, such as this.
Quantifying Constituent Attitudes
One key question arises, however, when striving to measure responsiveness: how can
researchers learn and understand the attitudes of constituents regarding legislative (and
legislator) actions? More importantly, are constituents aware of what is happening in Congress,
and do they have beliefs and attitudes regarding these actions? Attempts to answer these
questions over the past few decades have led to contradictory results.
In 1963, Miller and Stokes found that constituents were “almost totally uninformed about
legislative issues in Washington. At best the average citizen may be said to have some general
ideas about how the country should be run, which he is able to use in responding to particular
questions about what the government ought to do” (Miller and Stokes 1963). This finding is
problematic for responsiveness studies because the inability of constituents to express their
opinions adds difficulty to quantifying a relationship between constituent and congressperson.
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Unfortunately, this belief (of constituent ignorance regarding legislative actions) persisted for
many years (e.g., Lewis-Beck, et al. 2008; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). A 2010 study by
Ansolabehere and Jones found the opposite, however– that surveyed constituents were able to
express a definite opinion in favor of or against specific policies they were asked about: a
“[d]irect measure of constituents’ preferences on salient roll calls and perceptions of their
legislators’ behavior reveals that voters indeed harbor beliefs about their legislators’ policy
choices” (Ansolabehere and Jones 2010). Their conclusion regarding responsiveness in the
House of Representatives relied on the establishment of a variety of surveys that distinctly asked
constituents for their opinions on roll-call votes, surveys that didn’t exist when Miller and Stokes
were conducting their research. These studies, including the Cooperative Election Study,1
routinely ask citizens in all fifty states for their opinions on legislative actions, and have provided
a background for many recent studies (such as Hayes 2013 and this research). It is the existence
of these data sets that refute Miller and Stokes’ 1963 conclusion that constituents cannot be
expected to understand congressional action and supports the more modern understanding that it
is possible to measure the beliefs of constituents regarding roll-call votes. Given this finding, and
the increased availability of data regarding constituent attitudes in terms of both volume and
topics, researchers now have the ability to correlate legislative actions with constituent approval
(or disapproval). These studies measure responsiveness directly, but many researchers also do so
“indirectly,” by analyzing if, and how, constituents exercise control over their elected legislators
based on ideological alignment.
1 Formerly the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).
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Constituent Control
As the Constitution established for the House of Representatives and the 17th Amendment
established for the Senate, legislators in these chambers are democratically elected by citizens
every two or six years. Even though this appears to establish elections as the only time the
constituent has control over the congressperson, there exists debate over if this is truly the case.
Indeed, Douglas Arnold published a 1993 essay regarding this topic with a focus on answering
the question of how relatively uninformed constituents could “control” their elected
representatives (Arnold 1993). He divides his analysis into two “models”: the Standard Control
Model, in which everything a legislator does is controlled by a constituent (here, Arnold uses the
analogy of a car, saying the constituent is the driver and the legislator is the vehicle), and the
Alternative Model, in which the legislator has more control but is still held accountable by
constituents. He argues that Congress functions under the Alternative Model, justifying his belief
by saying that “the logic of the alternative control model is simple. Legislators adjust their
behavior in office to avoid electoral problems, and they do this by paying careful attention to the
known preferences of attentive publics and the potential preferences of inattentive citizens”
(Arnold 1993). Evidence in favor of the Alternative Model can be found in Kingdon 1989 and
Arnold 1990, and this attitude is also reflected in research conducted by Lee and Oppenheimer in
1999.
Support for Arnold’s so-called “Alternative Model” has gained traction in recent years,
especially as focus has solidified on elections as the primary mode of constituent control. With
that being said, findings reveal that this control doesn’t necessarily directly correlate with
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ideology; although Americans have historically cast their ballots with more importance placed on
the candidates’ positions on issues as opposed to their personal qualities,2 research by Bafumi
and Herron (2010) and Kassow and Finocchiaro (2011) has found that congresspeople tend to
hold views that differ from their constituencies. For example, Bafumi and Herron (2010) found
that moderates are unrepresented in Congress, for when one member is replaced, the new
member is more “extreme” in either the same or opposite leaning (Bafumi and Herron 2010).
Similarly, Kassow and Finocchiaro (2011) found that ideological divergence (how far a
congressperson is ideologically removed from their constituents) is common and is an important
indicator of electoral prospects– however, while congresspeople may hold beliefs different from
their constituents, those who are more frequently re-elected have more aligned beliefs with their
constituencies (Kassow and Finocchiaro 2011).
These findings, that constituents are able to control their representatives, are an important
indicator of the importance of responsiveness. As discussed by the above researchers, there
appears to be an electoral advantage to aligning ideologically with one’s constituents. This makes
it clear that responsiveness, as defined as the connection between congressperson and
constituent, should exert influence over the legislative actions taken by Congress. Previous
research has sought to directly analyze this, especially through an analysis of roll call votes and
public opinion polling.
Legislator Responsiveness
2 2020 exit polling indicated that 74% of voters viewed a candidate’s position on issues to be most important as
opposed to 23% who viewed their personal qualities as more important; 2008 exit polling saw 58% say position on
issues was more important compared to 39% who said personal qualities were most important. Polling completed by
Edison Research and accessed through CNN.
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While this form of responsiveness has been analyzed since the founding of the United
States, it is only in recent history that data and methodology have provided researchers with the
appropriate tools to meaningfully quantify it. The first to do so were Miller and Stokes, who
defined responsiveness, roughly speaking, as the degree of correlation between the preferences
of a constituent with the policy actions of their legislator; the more similar the two are, the more
responsive the congressperson is to their constituents (Miller and Stokes 1963). Robert Erickson
used this definition in 1990, when he attempted to quantify the perceptual agreement between
senators and constituents (as opposed to Miller and Stokes, who did the same in the House of
Representatives) using a two-pronged approach. His first step was to directly compare senators’
roll-call ideological scores (as quantified by the ACU) with their ideological reputation among
constituents (as measured by the NES). With this basis, Erickson compared the ideological
reputations of senators with the ideological preferences of state constituencies (Erickson 1990).
This study had many implications for future research by refining the method by which
responsiveness could be directly quantified.
Subsequent works, including that of Hayes (2013), built on this finding by using data
from the National Annenberg Election Study; Hayes (2013) used the data to correlate roll call
votes (as expressed by DW-NOMINATE scores) with economic subconstituencies (i.e.,
upper/middle/lower class) to examine responsiveness through the lens of income and wealth, and
he ultimately found that responsiveness differs according to economic status– with the most
between senators and upper-income class constituents, followed by the middle class, and the
lower-income class ultimately seeing no detectable responsiveness (Hayes 2013). This illustrates
an important concern with regards to this topic– that of unequal or distorted responsiveness.
Unequal responsiveness occurs when senators are biased in terms of which constituents they
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represent (which Hayes’ research finds empirical evidence of). This project seeks to minimize
the impacts of unequal responsiveness by using overall constituent attitudes in quantifying the
citizen-congressperson connection (i.e., focusing on if senators respond to a state’s majority
support or opposition to a bill, not just certain groups). Unequal responsiveness is not the only
concern with this type of study– Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) explain the potential issues that
arise from distortion in the Senate chamber with regards to responsiveness.
Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation changed the
nature and focus of responsiveness studies. Lee and Oppenheimer’s research drilled deep into the
establishment, functions, and impacts of the United States Senate on governance, and much of
their analysis focused on the impacts of distortion in the chamber, i.e., quantifying the impacts of
equal state representation on unequal state populations, as well as how that impacts specific
senators. A key finding from their research heavily impacts responsiveness studies in the Senate,
and a possible reason why responsiveness studies in the Senate were uncommon for such a long
time, is the fact that small-state senators have more leeway in how they vote than do large-state
senators. One synopsis of the issue as told to Lee and Oppenheimer (and hence discussed in
Sizing Up the Senate) is this: “it’s a lot easier [to represent a small state] because you don’t have
conflicting constituencies. In New York there’s an organized constituency against you on almost
everything…in small states it’s more of a company town” (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999). This
dichotomy heavily influences responsiveness studies because the constituents of smaller states
might not have a policy preference or priority when it comes to a topic. For example, the
constituents of a smaller interior state might not be as concerned with fishing or marine life
policies as a larger coastal state; therefore, a senator from an interior state has more leeway in
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voting however he or she feels on bills regarding said topic. This presents a challenge in terms of
responsiveness because the entire premise of responsiveness is to determine if a congressperson
votes as a citizen wishes them to– but if the citizen has no preference, then there can be no
responsiveness.
This issue (that of some senators having the freedom to cast votes whichever direction
they choose) has been analyzed by many different researchers over time, with conflicting results.
Wright and Berkman (1986) and Warshaw (2016) find that senators “are more attentive to their
constituents’ views later in the electoral cycle…Senators move toward the electoral middle when
elections approach” (Warshaw 2016). Warshaw also found, however, that senators were still
responsive to public opinion, as did Stratmann (2000) and Ahuja (1994), who found that senators
two years out from re-election campaigns were more responsive than senators four years away
(Ahuja 1994). These findings are important because they indicate that, while senators may vote
against the wishes of their constituents occasionally (quantifying this is one of the goals of this
research), thoughts of re-election are never completely absent from the mind (theoretically
leading to alignment between votes and constituent opinions). Because this study focuses on
hot-button issues that tend to impact citizens regardless of their geographical location, such as
healthcare and tax reform, votes on these issues are likely to be highlighted in future election
cycles regardless of when the vote was taken. For example, the impacts of the 2010 Affordable
Care Act were still discussed and important in the run-up to the 2018 midterm and 2020
presidential elections (i.e., Hall and Tolbert 2018). These indicate that senators not up for
re-election in 2012 could still be held accountable for their votes in the future. This should
alleviate the potential issue of higher responsiveness towards the end of a term. Furthermore,
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while distortion with regards to responsiveness is an issue, it doesn’t necessarily impact this
study in the sense that the purpose of this study is to identify instances of senators voting against
the wishes of their constituents.
Therefore, while there are issues that arise with studies of responsiveness such as this
one, this study uses information and processes learned from prior studies to answer a unique
research question.
Gaps and Purpose
It can, therefore, be seen that responsiveness studies have progressed and developed since
their inception prior to the Constitution’s ratification. Many of these studies have found
interesting, and sometimes even contradictory, results. For example, Miller and Stokes (1963)
and Hayes (2013) found mixed results in that congresspeople were responsive to either different
subsets of their constituency or were only responsive in certain areas. Arnold (1993) and
Ansolabehere and Jones (2010), however, found results that more-or-less aligned unilaterally
between senator and constituent. While these studies form the background for this
responsiveness analysis research, they also make clear the fact that there is much more to
understand and study regarding this all-too-vital relationship. Consequently, it is only logical to
use these prior studies as a foundation and apply these methodologies to studying the United
States Senate as a whole.
The articles discussed above collectively inspired this study of responsiveness, which
aims to fill some of the gaps presented by these researchers. For example, this research project
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will expand specifically on Ansolabehere and Jones’ 2010 study by turning attention to the
United States Senate, on Hayes’ 2013 study by widening the lens to examine multiple policy
areas, and on Lee and Oppenheimer’s 1999 book by focusing on the impacts of representation on
policy substance, more specifically how ideology impacts (or fails to impact) policy votes on
selected topics. On top of filling the “gaps” in these articles in the respective ways mentioned
above, this project is different in that it examines responsiveness for more legislation across a
wider range of topics (including domestic policies, foreign issues, and executive nominations)
for a longer period of time (six sessions of Congress) during which the filibuster was
increasingly impacting legislative actions in the chamber.
Guiding Theory
The theory I test in this project has its foundation in the theories of Madison and Arnold.
James Madison was greatly worried that “the people would be lost sight of altogether” if there
was a removal between the citizens and the selection method of congresspeople– he favored an
approach where those elected were directly responsible to their constituents (Madison 1920).
While the original method of senator selection violated Madison’s attitude and proposed
approach, the 17th amendment reinstated a direct connection between a senator and their
constituents. Ergo, Madisonian theory suggests that the actions of a senator should be inspired
and influenced by the attitudes of his or her constituents. The clearest evidence of this comes
from Federalist 10, in which Madison writes “the public voice, pronounced by the
representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by
the people themselves, convened for the purpose” (Federalist Papers 1-10). In this statement,
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Madison argues that a government of elected congresspeople (i.e., senators) is better able to
comprehend and support the overall needs of a constituency than a pure democracy (where the
self-interests of each individual would result in chaos, the establishment of factions, and an
unwelcome final outcome). Madison supports this separation so that “the great and aggregate
interests [are] being referred to the national,” leaving local issues to be dealt with by local
governments (Federalist Papers 1-10). His inclusion of the term “aggregate” in this phrase
conveys the importance he places on representatives and senators voting in favor of legislation
supported by the majority of their constituents. It can therefore be seen that Madisonian theory
expects, and indeed dictates, that senators vote as their constituents want so as to result in a truly
representative democracy.
This underlying theory is substantiated and expounded upon by Arnold (1993), when he
proposed an updated version wherein the senator has more freedom to act as they wish, but
focuses on constituents when it comes to major legislation due to a desire for re-election (Arnold
1993). Arnold (1993) suggests that senators focus on constituent wants when it comes to major
legislation due to a fear of punishment and/or repercussions. He argues that activists are more
likely to “ring the alarm bells'' when senators vote against the beliefs of their constituents; given
that the time when the Senate considers major legislation is likely to be the time when
constituent awareness and attention is highest, Arnold’s model suggests that this is also the time
when senators have the greatest fear of voting “out of line.” Therefore, it only makes sense that
senators would vote as their constituents want them to on these key legislative issues.
This combination of Madison and Arnold’s theories provides the basis for this project and
the hypotheses used to answer the research question. All four hypotheses introduced below,
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therefore, rely on this guiding theory that senators directly respond to their constituents on major
legislation.
Expectations
Four hypotheses enable the testing of the research question on both a broad and more
focused and specific level. The first two hypotheses seek to determine “individual
responsiveness,” or how closely the votes of individual senators align with the beliefs of their
constituents, and the final two hypotheses investigate “joint responsiveness,” or how frequently
the votes of both senators from a state align with the beliefs of their constituents.
First, I test whether senators are responsive to their constituents on key votes on major
legislation from the 111th through 116th Congresses. The Responsiveness Hypothesis essentially
strives to answer the research question as proposed by using CES public opinion polling and
Senate roll call voting over this time frame to determine if such a relationship exists (a discussion
of this data and its advantages can be found in the “Data Sources” section below). This
hypothesis has its foundations rooted in the analyses of Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) and
Bafumi and Herron (2010), who used different methodologies to attempt to answer similar
questions to this. Lee and Oppenheimer found higher responsiveness in smaller states (with more
homogeneous constituencies) as opposed to larger states (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999) and
Bafumi and Herron found that “micro-level representation [that between voters and legislators]
in the United States is weak” (Bafumi and Herron 2010); this hypothesis re-visits these earlier
conclusions and compares them to actions in more recent Congresses across a wider range of
bills (as opposed to the ideology measures used by Bafumi and Herron). Due to the impacts of
increased polarization (i.e., closer elections in more ideologically heterogeneous states should
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lead to senators voting as a majority of constituents want so as to earn more votes at re-election),
and the guiding theory behind this research, this hypothesis predicts a high correlation between
senator and constituent preferences. This hypothesis aligns with the guiding theory because it
directly quantifies the relationship between senator and constituent, to see if the correlation is
high (which is expected under the guiding theory).
While responsiveness as a whole is important to consider, and indeed is the primary aim
of this study, it is also possible that senators are more or less responsive on various issues, as
found by Miller and Stokes (1963). Therefore, my second hypothesis investigates responsiveness
through this narrower lens.
My second expectation is that senators will be more responsive to constituents depending
on the topic of the vote. Due to the high dependence of constituents on social and economic
(domestic) policies, I expect high responsiveness on votes concerning these bills. Because the
average constituent knows very little about foreign policy (CFR 2019; Bennett, et al. 1996;
Almond 1960), especially due to the infrequency with which it appears to directly impact
constituent lives as compared to domestic policy, I expect less responsiveness on foreign policy
and national security votes. Additionally, because cabinet positions are inherently partisan
appointments (as given by the fact that they are appointed by the president to achieve his or her
political agenda) and because appointment to Supreme Court positions are political objectives of
both parties (RNC 2020; DNC 2020), I expect senators’ votes on executive nominations to
follow a party line as opposed to constituent attitudes. Therefore, the Issue Relevance Hypothesis
predicts higher responsiveness on social and economic votes than on executive nomination and
foreign policy/national security votes. This hypothesis follows in the footsteps of Miller and
Stokes (1963), who found high responsiveness for social and economic welfare as well as civil
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rights issues and practically nonexistent responsiveness for foreign policy issues, and Svensen
(2018), who found high deferentiality to the executive on foreign policy but not on domestic
issues. Both of these studies indicate that my expectation for this hypothesis conforms with
historical evaluation and consensus thinking regarding the topic.
This second hypothesis, at first glance, seems to contradict the guiding theory behind this
project– after all, the Issue Relevance Hypothesis expects responsiveness to differ among topics,
which is different from the guiding theory’s expectation of high overall responsiveness. With that
said, this hypothesis actually fits with the guiding theory because it incorporates both Madison
and Arnold’s approaches, although it places a heavier focus on Arnold’s belief that senators have
more control over how they vote (and so they don’t always vote as their constituents want them
to). Therefore, this hypothesis fits with the guiding theory because it relies on direct
responsiveness, albeit in a slightly different manner than the prior hypothesis.
Third, I test the Joint Responsiveness Hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that both
senators representing the same state should vote the same on key legislative issues because they
represent the same constituency. Such an expectation finds its roots in research by Gross and
Kirkland (2019), who found empirical evidence that Senate delegations tend to collaborate on
legislation and co-sponsor each other’s legislation far more frequently than they co-sponsor bills
introduced by other senators. This hypothesis seeks to expand on that research by suggesting that
same-state senators tend to vote the same on key legislation, regardless of sponsorship or
co-sponsorship.
Ties to the guiding theory that connected the first hypothesis to the theory ground this
hypothesis, as well– namely because this hypothesis also seeks to empirically link senator
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actions with constituent opinions. A high correlation is expected due to the reasons established in
the “Guiding Theory” section, above.
The final hypothesis I test is the Joint Issue Relevance Hypothesis, which expects similar
results to the second hypothesis (that both senators from a given state more frequently vote the
same on social and economic policies than on foreign policy/national security and executive
nominations) for the same reasons, that citizens and constituents may be more impacted by social
and economic (domestic) policies than they are by foreign policy/national security or executive
nominations. As with the third hypothesis’ relationship to the first, this hypothesis is an
expansion on the second hypothesis because it looks more broadly at responsiveness. This
expectation has largely the same connections to the guiding theory as the second hypothesis
does, as discussed above.
These four hypotheses will collectively provide multiple dimensions to my research
question; in the following section, I discuss the methods and sources used to evaluate senator
responsiveness.
Data Sources
The problem that has accompanied, and indeed inhibited, historical attempts at measuring
and testing congressional responsiveness is the difficulty inherent in identifying the attitudes of
constituents. As was discussed earlier in this study, Ansolabehere and Jones (2010) showed that
constituents harbored beliefs regarding public policy and proposed legislation, leaving the only
gap between theory and practice (with regards to conducting quantitative research) being (the
lack of) a method of gathering copious amounts of data and information. Since 2006, however,
the Cooperative Election Study (CES) has filled this disconnect by surveying thousands of
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constituents from all fifty states and the District of Columbia every year to identify demographic
information, political affiliation, and attitudes regarding politicians and legislation (Cooperative
Election Study). The result is a series of datasets containing the information necessary to conduct
studies with goals and purposes such as that of this project.
The CES has many benefits in addition to providing information regarding citizen
attitudes towards legislation, namely in the form of its size and stratification. From 2009 through
2020, the CES interviewed an average of 37,711 participants (see Figure 4, below, for
respondents per year of this study). Having such large sample sizes is important because they
reduce the potential impact of measurement error (which can be common among studies with too
few respondents; see Achen 1978), and can therefore provide a much better picture of the
ideological landscape of the states. And, while the copious amounts of data enable this reduction
in measurement error, the organizers of the CES enable post-stratification of data with “common
weights” that attempt to (better) match the respondents of a given year’s survey with the overall
composition of a given state or territory. Combined, these two aspects to the Cooperative
Election Study make it ideal for use in this research study to identify constituent attitudes
towards key votes on major legislation (as identified by the organizers of the Cooperative
Election Study).
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Fig. 4. CES Respondents per Study Year (Cooperative Election Study)
It is also important to note that the legislation considered in this study to be “key votes” are those
selected by the organizers of each year’s CES study. This is discussed more in the “Future
Research Opportunities” section below. For a listing of the key votes used in this study, see
Appendix A.
Due to the limited number of questions asked by the CES organizers each year, there are
two limitations the use of this data imparts on this study that are important to discuss. First and
foremost, the organizers asked participants their opinions of various pieces of legislation across
the span of multiple years (for example, the question regarding attitudes towards repealing the
Affordable Care Act was asked every year from 2012 to 2017). While this has potential benefits
to researchers studying other questions (see “Future Research Opportunities,” below), it created a
dilemma for this study. Whenever possible, the CES question and responses were paired with the
roll call vote in the same year the roll call vote was taken. In certain cases, public opinions
regarding legislation were not surveyed until the year after the Senate considered the bill; in
these situations, responsiveness on that legislation was measured in the year the CES asked the
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question, not the year the vote was taken due to (perceived) software limitations with Stata. It is
unlikely that this had a serious impact on the results of this study, because no vote was paired
with a survey administered outside the given Congress’ timeframe, but it is important to note.
Another impact of this is that there is a very small sample size of (public opinions regarding)
bills, ranging from a maximum of five in 2009 and 2017 to a minimum of one in 2018 (these
numbers reflect the first incorporation of a bill into the study). The average number of “original”
legislation (meaning the first time a bill considered in the Senate was asked about in the CES)
considered in each year of this study’s timeframe (excluding 2011 and 2019) is 3.3 bills.
The second limitation of using CES data is that there were two years of the survey’s
administration, 2011 and 2019, in which no questions were asked regarding bills considered in
that year’s Congress. The impact of this in this study is simply the exclusion of those years,
leading to a study timeframe of 2009-2020 with data from 2009-2010, 2012-2018, and 2020.
Overall, these two limitations inherent with using the CES as the sole public opinion source for
this study are dwarfed by the positives of using the CES, namely the large sample size,
stratification, and that it surveyed opinions towards important legislation.
To prepare a more complete dataset with which the aforementioned hypotheses can be
tested, the CES data is connected with data from a few other sources. First, NOMINATE scores
are utilized to gain an overall understanding of senatorial voting patterns, and the Senate’s
Senators of the United States, 1789-Present and Congress’ Biographical Directory of the United
States Congress are used to identify individual senators’ party affiliation, first term, and years to
re-election. Further, congress.gov’s extensive database was used first to pair each CES roll-call
question to an actual piece of legislation introduced in Congress, and secondly to identify the
votes of senators on said legislation. Information provided by the United States Census provides
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demographic information about the residents in each state over the time period studied. I
included five such demographic results for each state: percentage African American, percentage
female, percentage possessing a bachelor’s degree or greater (of ages 24 and older), percentage
aged 65 or older, and percentage in poverty. Due to similarities in the degree of change in each of
these demographic populations in each state every year of this time period, I used the 2010
demographic data for study years 2009-2014, and the 2015 demographic data for study years
2015-2020.
Data from each of these sources was collated and coded into a specific set of variables for
use during the hypothesis testing and data analysis phases of the project, and descriptions of each
variable used in the analysis are presented in Appendix B.
Methodology
To test the Responsiveness Hypothesis and Issue Relevance Hypothesis, a unique
combination of the capabilities of Stata and Excel was used; I was able to identify the average
level of support for each key vote in each state using the CES datasets in the Stata interface,
which were then diligently transferred to an Excel spreadsheet containing information
concerning each individual senator. This yielded a spreadsheet for each year, 2009-2020, with a)
demographic information about each senator (i.e., name, state represented, years to re-election),
b) the senator’s votes on identified key votes, c) demographic information regarding the state
constituency, and d) the average level of constituent support for key votes. I was then able to find
each senator’s average level of support of the key legislation for each year and the constituent’s
average level of support of the key legislation for each year.
31
In order to test the second hypothesis, the Issue Relevance Hypothesis, however, further
classifications of the data were necessary to divide the key votes into the four categories of social
policy, economic policy, foreign policy and national security, and executive nominations. The
division of votes into these categories was almost unilaterally determined by the “Policy Area”
assigned to each bill by the Congressional Research Service. A listing of each bill, the assigned
Policy Area, and my classifications can be found in Appendix C. It is important to note that there
were five instances in which the assigned Policy Area does not correlate with my designation.
Those are the: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010 (classified by CRS as “commerce” bill,
suggesting an economic policy classification, but, due to an amendment striking the text of the
original bill and inserting the text of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010 in its place,
that classification is less satisfactory than social policy), the two CRS-classified “Transportation
and Public Works Bills” (the text of S.Amdt.1537, regarding the Keystone Pipeline, suggests a
social policy bill while the text of FAST Act suggests an economic policy), and the votes on the
two articles of impeachment against President Trump (I chose to classify these as Foreign Policy
and National Security due to the motivation behind the impeachment charges).
After classifying the bills in this way, the total of 33 bills over the time period were
divided into relatively equally-sized groups of 12 (social policy), 7 (economic policy), 7 (foreign
policy and national security), and 7 (executive nominations). A chart displaying the total number
of analyzed bills per year, as well as the total number of bills in each category, can be found in
Figure 5 below.
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Fig. 5. Bill Classifications by Year, 2009-2020
With the bills split up into these four categories, and with senator votes identified for
every bill, I was then able to find the average number of times each senator voted in favor of bills
in each category in each given year (a social policy support average, economic policy support
average, foreign policy/national security support average, and an executive nomination support
average). I was also able to use the imported CES average support numbers for each bill to
similarly find average constituent levels of support for the four categories of legislation. These
datasets were then imported into Stata, where regression analyses were performed to answer the
hypotheses discussed in the “Expectations” section above.
To obtain workable data sets needed to test the third hypothesis, the Joint Responsiveness
Hypothesis, I created an Excel spreadsheet for each year, 2009-2020, in which each state filled
one row, which contained (at the start) the demographic information about the two senators from
each state and their voting behaviors regarding identified key votes. This enabled me to code
senatorial agreement for each key vote (see Appendix B for variable names and codes). When
coding agreement, the only matches that counted for agreement were when both senators voted
in favor of a bill or when both senators voted against a bill– any time the senators’ votes
divulged or only one senator cast a vote, it was coded as disagreement (see “Future Research
33
Opportunities,” below, for more information). From there, I was able to merge in constituent
demographics (i.e., gender, age, race, education, income) data, as well as constituent attitudes
towards key legislation (in the form of % support), from the CES.
To test the Joint Issue Relevance Hypothesis, I classified the bills in this joint
responsiveness spreadsheet and found senator support and constituent support averages for each
category, just as I did in creating the datasets needed to test the second hypothesis discussed
above. I was then able to import this data into Stata, where regression analyses were performed
to answer the third and fourth hypotheses outlined above.
Senator-Constituent Agreement
After compiling the necessary data into manageable databases and spreadsheets, but
before running regressions to test hypotheses, I ran a series of basic computations in an attempt
to determine the overall level of agreement between senators and constituents on key votes
identified by the organizers of the Cooperative Election Study from 2009-2020. The results of
this computation can be seen in Figure 6, below.
Fig. 6. Agreement Between Senators and Constituents, 2009-2020 (Cooperative Election Study)
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While this represents an extremely crude application of the data available, especially in light of
the studies conducted below to test the aforementioned responsiveness hypotheses, it also
provides an important precursor to those results. “Responsiveness” differs from “agreement”
simply in terms of the motivations behind the senator’s vote: “responsiveness” looks to see if
senators are voting as their constituents want (or with party, ideology, etc. in mind), but
“agreement” just looks at the results of that to see how frequently the senator’s vote aligned with
the majority preference of the constituents. This chart of agreement reveals that, motivations
aside, senators tended to vote with the majority preference of their state a majority of the time
over this timeframe. That being said, this method is much less scientific than the methods used
below to test my hypotheses, making this conclusion objectively crude and unscientific.
Nonetheless, this chart was created through a multistep Excel process. First, I paired the votes of
senators on key votes (from congress.gov) with constituent favorability regarding those same
votes (as determined by the CES) in Excel. I then coded the CES results to determine how, on a
binary (1 = yea, 0 = nay), the constituency would have voted. This method is crude because it
makes broad assumptions– for example, it assumes a constituency that was 50.1% in favor of a
bill is the same as a constituency that was 87.4% in favor of a bill. I used this method despite this
“flaw” due to its similarity to senatorial elections– a senator elected with 50.1% of the vote is
just as elected as a senator elected with 87.4% of the vote. Regardless, having two binaries
(senator vote binary and constituency vote binary) enabled me to determine how frequently the
two were equal. The frequency could be calculated into a percent agreement per year, which was,
in turn, used to create the above chart.
This chart, therefore, serves as a good preface to the statistical processes used to test the
established hypotheses because it provides an understanding of the frequency with which
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senators voted as their constituents would have, setting up the study for an investigation into how
frequently senators were responsive to the wants of their constituents as opposed to a number of
other factors.
Testing Individual Responsiveness
In this study, as in many of the studies discussed above, I define responsiveness as the
connection between the behavior of senators and the opinions of their constituencies. To test the
first two hypotheses outlined in the “Expectations” section above, I estimate a regression model
using senator votes on key legislation, constituent attitudes towards key legislation, and
demographic and partisan information regarding senators and their constituents.
First, to test the Responsiveness Hypothesis, I look at the bivariate regression between
senator vote (the dependent variable) and constituent attitudes (as measured by the 2009-2020
CES). Table 1A in Appendix D shows the bivariate results. I find a positive, strong, and
statistically significant relationship over much of this timeframe. The fact that such a positive
and strong correlation exists seems to indicate that the more a state population supported a bill,
the more likely a senator was to vote in favor of that legislation. However, a bivariate model does
not account for the whole story of responsiveness– without the inclusion of a series of control
variables, the results above prove misleading.
To account for the impacts of different demographic and identity information, I include
eight control variables in my “complete” (multivariate) model of responsiveness. For the
senators, I control for party affiliation because of the hyper-charged political atmosphere that has
developed in recent years. I also control for a senator’s first term to account for a potential
difference between actions of senators when they are new to the chamber and media attention
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may be higher than those senators in returning terms, who may not be as concerned with media
attention all the time. Third, I control for years to re-election, to see if senators become more
responsive as their reelection campaigns near. Wright and Berkman (1986), Ahuja (1994), and
Warshaw (2016) all found evidence of years to reelection playing a role in senatorial actions,
providing precedence for including this as a control variable. In terms of constituency controls, I
control for the percentage of a state’s population that is African American, female, over 65 years
old, with a bachelor’s degree, and in poverty because these are all different subconstituencies
senators may or may not respond to (see Hayes 2013 for an example).
Once these controls are added into the model, the statistically significant relationship
between senator vote and constituent so obvious in the bivariate model disappears.
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Table 1 above shows a statistically significant relationship between senator vote and
party, with infrequent relationships to the other control variables. Only 2010 retains a statistically
significant relationship between senator vote and constituent attitudes. These results indicate
minimal support for the Responsiveness Hypothesis.
The Issue Relevance Hypothesis similarly finds minimal support. Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5
below show the relationships between constituent support and social policy, economic policy,
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foreign policy/national security, and executive nominations, respectively. As with the results of
the first hypothesis, the bivariate data (Tables 2A, 3A, 4A, and 5A, found in Appendix D)
indicate strong, positive, and statistically significant relationships between constituent support
and senator vote, but these disappear once the controls are incorporated. This second hypothesis
predicted higher correlations between senator vote and constituent opinion on social and
economic policies and lower correlations on foreign policy/national security and executive
nominations, but the results indicate no statistically significant relationship in any year there was
a key vote on social policy, economic policy, or foreign policy/national security. It should be
noted that in 2020, the only key vote on economic policy was the unanimously-passed CARES
Act, and the only key vote on foreign policy/national security in 2016 was the
unanimously-passed Iran Sanctions Extension Act; because these bills were passed unanimously
(i.e., no difference in senator vote), the regression computed the results as they appear in the
tables below. Interestingly, two years exhibit a statistically significant relationship between
senator vote and constituency opinion on executive nominations: 2010 and 2020. In both of those
years, however, there was also a statistically significant relationship between senator vote and
senator party. Because there is no data in support of the Issue Relevance Hypothesis– indeed,






Although the preceding results clearly indicate minimal responsiveness between senators
and their constituents and higher levels of responsiveness between senators and party, it remains
to be seen whether or not senate delegations are responsive to their constituents. In order to test
the final two hypotheses, I regressed the average level of agreement of same-state senators to key
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votes on constituent support for key legislation. This doesn’t directly test if senate delegations
vote jointly as their constituents want them to (for a discussion of this, see “Future Research
Opportunities” below), but it is an important indicator– if same-state senators aren’t voting
together a statistically significant percentage of the time, it is highly unlikely they vote together
as their constituents want a statistically significant percentage of the time.
I first test the Joint Responsiveness Hypothesis, which suggests that senators from the
same state vote jointly with higher levels of constituency favorability on all key legislation. As
with the Responsiveness Hypothesis above, I begin by running a bivariate regression of joint
senator vote (the dependent variable) and constituent attitudes (as measured by the 2009-2020
CES). Table 6A in Appendix D shows the bivariate results. Only in 2013 and 2020 does there
appear to be a statistically significant relationship (at p < 0.05), and both of those relationships
contradict each other, meaning 2013 has a strong, negative relationship (-2.442) and 2020 has a
strong, positive relationship (3.585). Therefore, the bivariate data for this hypothesis are
unhelpful with regard to answering the hypothesis. In order to do so, we must introduce a series
of control variables into the model.
I introduce seven variables into this model to control for the impacts of partisan and
demographic relationships. The five constituency control variables introduced into the individual
responsiveness model– percentage of a state’s population that is African American, female, over
65 years old, with a bachelor’s degree, and in poverty– are also introduced into this model, but
the two control variables concerning the senators are different. In this model, I control for joint
senator partisan affiliation– in essence, I control for if both senators are members of the same
party. Due to the impacts of partisan bias and the increased polarization of political institutions
such as Congress and the Senate, the party affiliation of both senators from a delegation may
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have an impact on joint responsiveness. Additionally, I control for average ideology, as measured
by DW-NOMINATE scores. DW-NOMINATE scores are measures of ideology, and are
calculated based on all the votes a legislator cast (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). The range of
DW-NOMINATE scores is from -1, representing the most liberal senators, to 1, representing the
most conservative senators. By averaging the ideology of both senators in a state delegation, I
am able to determine the ideological lean of a state delegation, and therefore control for the
impacts of ideology in the model. It is important to note that with both of these variables, the
calculation was based on the senators who either a) cast votes on all identified key legislation in
a given year, b) cast the most votes on identified key legislation in a given year, or, if multiple
senators “tied” for the number of votes cast, c) the senator who voted on the first piece of key
legislation in a given year. It is important to mention this because there were multiple times
throughout the span of this study, frequently when a new president took office, when an elected
senator was replaced by an appointed senator. This situation led to a maximum of four senators
representing any one state during a year in the timeframe of 2009-2020.
With these controls all added into the model, any statistically significant relationships
between joint senator vote and constituency (i.e., 2013 and 2020) disappear, and statistically
significant relationships between joint senator vote and same party emerge. Table 6 below shows
the results of this regression.
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This table clearly shows that there is no significant relationship between the frequency of both
members of a senate delegation voting together and the level of constituency support for key
legislation. Because the Joint Responsiveness Hypothesis predicted that such relationships would
exist, and none do, this hypothesis can also be rejected.
Despite the rejection of this hypothesis, it remains an open question whether there is any
responsiveness of joint senators to constituency opinion on social policy, economic policy,
foreign policy/national security, or executive nominations. Testing this represents a test of the
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fourth hypothesis, the Joint Issue Relevance Hypothesis. This hypothesis expects that there will
be higher responsiveness on social and economic policies than foreign policy/national security or
executive nominations. Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10 below show the results of regressions testing this
hypothesis. In no year of any of these topics was a statistically significant relationship identified
between joint senator vote and constituent opinion. This finding isn’t necessarily surprising when
compared with the bivariate results, as no relationship was identified in the bivariate regression
(see Tables 7A, 8A, 9A, and 10A in Appendix D). Interestingly, in almost every year of every
topic, there was a statistically significant relationship between joint senator vote and the same
party affiliation. Overall, therefore, no support can be found for the fourth hypothesis, and so it,





Therefore, the statistical analysis provides minimal evidence in favor of the
Responsiveness Hypothesis and no evidence in support of the Issue Relevance Hypothesis, Joint
Responsiveness Hypothesis, or Joint Issue Relevance Hypothesis.
Discussion
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I find minimal evidence of senator-constituent responsiveness in any of the models
created to test the four posited hypotheses. The data simply do not seem to support any such
statement that senators were responsive to constituents (over party, term, etc.) on key bills during
this time period. While the bivariate regressions created for the first two hypotheses showed a
strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between senator votes and constituent
opinions on key votes over much of this time period, the control variables removed and shifted
around these relationships to indicate either minimal, or no, responsiveness. The results of the
first hypotheses in terms of the relationship between a senator’s votes and their affiliated party
provide an interesting perspective on the chamber. Figure 7, below, shows the statistically
significant coefficient for the relationship between senator and the control variable of party. The
years each party held a majority in the Senate are indicated by the shading of the bar
(Democratic control from 2009-2014 is shaded in blue and Republican control from 2017-2020
is shaded in red).
Fig. 7. Senator Responsiveness to Party.
52
Due to the way in which the “party” variable was coded (see Appendix B for further details), it is
possible to put a number to the likelihood a senator of a given party is to vote in favor of key
legislation in a given year.3 The results displayed in Figure 7 above reveal that in 2009, 2010,
2013, 2014, and 2020, Republican senators were less likely to vote in favor of key legislation
than their Democratic colleagues. At first glance, this seems to make sense. After all, in years
that the Democrats held control over the chamber, they likely introduced bills targeting their
platform, bills that were contrary to the platform and goals of Republicans. An apparent puzzle
emerges, however, when it is noted that Republican senators were less likely to vote in favor of
key bills in 2020, a year in which they held control over the chamber. What seems like a
complicated and confusing situation, however, is resolved by looking at the data for 2020. There
were four key legislative votes in that year, the CARES Act (which held bipartisan support), the
nomination of Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court (the result of which was a
long-sought-after Republican platform goal), and votes on two impeachment articles (that
Republican senators almost unilaterally opposed). It therefore makes sense for this negative
relationship to exist in 2020, because half of the introduced legislation was contrary to their
partisan goals. A similar situation is present with 2012, 2017, and 2018, years in which
Republican senators were more likely to vote in favor of key legislation than Democratic
senators. Again, 2017 and 2018 make sense (as Republicans held control over the chamber), but
2012’s inclusion is confusing. A look at the key votes cast in that year reveals four: the Birth
Control Exemption amendment (heavily supported by Republicans), a vote on the Keystone
Pipeline (also supported by Republicans), the Middle Class Tax Cut Act (opposed by all
3 “Republican” was coded as 1 and Democrat as 0; therefore, the coefficient indicates what percent more likely
Republican senators were to vote in favor of a bill than Democrats. A negative coefficient, therefore, indicates that
Republicans were less likely to vote in favor of a bill than Democrats, and a positive coefficient means they were
more likely to vote in favor of a bill..
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Republican senators), and the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (a bipartisan bill supported by
most Republican senators and some Democratic senators). Therefore, a similar situation occurred
in 2012 as 2020, and these results actually make a lot more sense.
This analysis stemmed from the same research and same data that produced evidence
opposing both of the first two hypotheses, thus indicating the value and importance of
conducting these studies even when the end result is the rejection of hypotheses. With that being
said, it is also important to discuss what the results of the introduced and tested hypotheses are
and what they mean in relation to the guiding theory of this study. The results sections above
revealed the results of the study to be an almost unilateral rejection of hypotheses; the only
expectation that received a slight degree of significance was the Responsiveness Hypothesis. Due
to this, the results of this study correlate more closely with that of Miller and Stokes (1963) and
Hayes (2013), although they cast a slightly more pessimistic view. Both Miller and Stokes (1963)
and Hayes (2013) found evidence of mixed responsiveness– Miller and Stokes (1963) found
responsiveness to different policy topics and Hayes (2013) found responsiveness to different
subconstituencies (namely high-income/high-class citizens over middle-class and lower-class).
This study, by comparison, finds minimal evidence of responsiveness on key votes both in
general and through a topic-by-topic analysis. In this way, the results of this project contradict its
established guiding theory. There is minimal evidence that senators subscribe to Madisonian
theory when it comes to responsiveness (clearly, senators over this time period focused more on
party than on the attitudes of their constituents), nor is there evidence to suggest that senators
abided by the theory produced by Arnold (1993)– that, while senators have (more) freedom to
act as they wish, they focus on their constituents when it comes to votes on major legislation due
to their desire for re-election (Arnold 1993). This study specifically looked at major legislation
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and key votes on that legislation, and yet found no indication of responsiveness to constituent
wants. Therefore, the results of the hypotheses tested in this study indicate minimal support for
the guiding theory underlying this project. Instead, they seem to indicate that senators are more
responsive to their party and partisan alignments. A likely reason, perhaps the most likely reason,
for this has to do with the increased politicization and polarization of Washington, D.C.,
especially surrounding these key legislative acts. A majority of the bills considered by this
project heavily aligned with party platform goals (e.g., RNC 2020; DNC 2020), and therefore it
is highly possible that party priority took precedence over constituent priority. Empirically
assessing this would require further research, studies, and investigations (see Future Research
Opportunities below). At first glance, however, the minimal support for this project’s guiding
theory is likely due to the high responsiveness of senators to their parties, which is potentially
due to the hyper-partisan nature of government in the current era.
It is also important to revisit the discussion on “Senator-Constituent Agreement”
presented earlier in this report. In that section, a high degree of agreement was found between
senators and their constituents, as measured by the senator voting as the majority of their
constituents wanted; a question emerges when comparing this result to the results of the
hypothesis tests, which identified a lack of alignment between senator vote and constituent
preference. While identifying a specific reason why these results don’t align is difficult, there
exist a few possibilities. First and foremost, because the hypothesis tests included the actual
percentage of constituent support, its results indicate a relationship when statistically significant
(i.e., for every one percentage point increase in constituent favorability of a bill, the senator was
x percent more likely to vote in favor of that bill), whereas the agreement model presented prior
relied on a binary for constituent support. Therefore, one potential reason for the difference in
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results is the fact that the two models measured different aspects of this relationship, and the
inputs used to generate the models were themselves different. A second potential explanation is
that the agreement model didn’t account for party and potential party influences; indeed, the
Bivariate Regression models (see Appendix D) seemed to indicate high levels of senator
responsiveness to constituents, but this statistical significance almost unilaterally disappeared as
soon as party was introduced to the model. The similarity expressed between the Bivariate
Regression models and the Senator-Constituent Agreement model in regards to both finding
higher potential correlations compared to the models that include party might, therefore, indicate
that it is the exclusion of party in the one model that caused the contrary results. These are only
two potential reasons for such a disagreement and disparity of results, but there are many other
possibilities. It is clear from this discussion, as well as those presented above, therefore, that the
results of this study are not an ending point for this research, but merely a stepping stone in the
path to understanding this vital relationship.
Future Research Opportunities
While the results of this study are interesting to consider on their own, perhaps more
fascinating are the many other topics and projects that can be done that would add context and
information to this study and the ongoing academic discussion regarding responsiveness in the
United States Senate. Throughout this report so far, a few such opportunities for future research
have been mentioned, but the results lend themselves to a few more ideas, as well.
First and foremost, one of the major shortcomings of this project is that it relies on data
collected by another source, and, while the information provided by the Cooperative Election
Study was extremely useful for this study, this project was limited in scope to the questions
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asked by the CES. Due to limited space available for questions, many of the roll-call votes the
organizers asked constituents about were hyper-political or highly partisan in nature, but not all
legislation considered by the chamber is. Future research studies that can produce and
incorporate data about more bills ranging in partisanship and topic would be able to greatly
expand on the methods and conclusions of projects such as this one. Additionally, while the
CES’ tendency to ask constituents for their opinions about the same piece of legislation for
multiple years in a row was a hindrance to this study (for sample size purposes, constituent
attitudes on more bills would have been beneficial), studies that analyze shifts in constituent
opinion, especially with respect to responsiveness, would add yet another important dimension to
this field of literature.
Additionally, there exists room for more studies on joint responsiveness, particularly
expansion on two areas from this project, which would be more than welcome. In this project,
for example, joint responsiveness was coded one way if both senators voted in favor of or against
a bill and another way if one senator voted in favor and one against or if one senator voted and
the other didn’t. There are a few cases when this style of coding is impractical and can skew the
results. For example, Senator Ted Kennedy served in the Senate from 1962 to 2009, but didn’t
cast any votes on legislation from April 2009 through his death in August of that year (Cillizza
2009). As a result, most of the votes for the 2009 Massachusetts delegation were coded with
senator disagreements, when that would most likely not have been the case had Senator Kennedy
been able to vote. Another study that addressed this concern through a different coding structure,
for example, would be able to circumvent problems such as this that might have skewed the data
and results. Additionally, this project only investigated whether or not two senators voted the
same, not whether they both voted in favor of or against any legislation. This means that the
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results for the third and fourth hypotheses are unable to truly capture joint responsiveness,
because there is no indication of whether both senators voted together as their constituents
wanted them to. Another study that addressed this through a different coding or testing scheme
would be able to provide more information and a more concrete answer to this hypothesis.
These are a few recommendations for future studies based on perceived shortcomings or
improvement areas noted from this study, but there are also opportunities for future research that
continue in the same vein as this study, but expand on it and consider other aspects. For example,
a qualitative companion and follow-up to this quantitative study would be interesting to consider
and conduct because senators' votes on legislation may be caused by any number of factors. This
was clearly seen through the introduction of control variables into models created for this study.
By conducting interviews with those involved in a senator’s decision-making process with
regards to how they decide whether to vote “yea” or “nay,” new lenses and additional first-hand
information would be able to attach a more “human” aspect to this study– and responsiveness
studies as a whole.
One of the many benefits of scholarly research is that it is never complete. Research on
responsiveness in the United States Senate has been happening for just as long, if not longer,
than the Senate has been in session, and there will always be more hypotheses to generate and
tests to run on this topic. The benefits of conducting studies such as this one are present not only
in the generation of results to the proposed research question, but in the generation of
opportunities for future research. While this study found results contrary to the proposed guiding
theory and supporting hypotheses, it also identified many different directions in which to pursue
further research that will lead to the generation of new ideas and new theories about
responsiveness in the United States Senate.
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Conclusion
This paper examined responsiveness of United States senators to their constituents on key
votes on major legislation from 2009 through 2020, a time period that reflects growing partisan
polarization and intensification of the political process accompanied by an increase in perceived
animosity and partisanship amongst members of the House of Representatives and Senate. I find
minimal support for responsiveness of senators to constituents and frequent relationships
between senators and party. These findings raise the question of whether responsiveness to
constituents has significantly deteriorated since the works of Arnold (1993) and Ansolabehere
and Jones (2010), who both found some semblance of responsiveness between senators and
constituents, or if these findings represent a continued downward trend in terms of this
relationship, as indicated by the works of Miller and Stokes (1963) and Hayes (2013), who found
responsiveness only on certain topics or to certain subsets of the state constituency.
While these findings raise this question regarding historical responsiveness (trends), this
study also generates many more opportunities for future research studies to investigate
responsiveness not only through a quantitative, but a qualitative, lens. It is clear from the results
of this research that much more work and many more studies must be conducted to truly
understand the complicated and ever-changing nature of the relationship between a
congressperson and those they are elected to serve.
That being said, an ever-present question surrounding not only this study, but previous
and future studies of responsiveness in the Senate, is whether or not this (lack of) responsiveness
adheres to or diverges from the Senate as originally created. While Madisonian theory claims
that the actions of senators should be inspired by the attitudes of their constituents, the Senate as
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formed by the United States Constitution called for an upper chamber removed from state
constituencies. It was only with the 17th amendment that senators had any direct relationship with
the citizens residing in the states they served, and the filibuster still exerts its influence by
preventing a simple majority from passing most forms of legislation. This question is wholly
important and relevant to studies such as this one, because the lack of responsiveness found in
papers such as this one may actually adhere to this creationist perspective.
After all of these debates and all of this research, one thing remains perfectly clear: the
United States Senate, just like the United States of America it serves, remains a continually
evolving and developing body. While senators are elected and retire, party platforms change, and
entire populations shift, there is one relationship that will connect these groups for as long as
America persists– that of the Senator and the Citizen.
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Appendix A: Key Votes Listing
111th Congress                                                                                                                                  
2009
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (2009)
Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (2009)
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (2009)
S.Amdt.1511 to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (2009)
*Hate Crimes
Sonia Sotomayor – The Supreme Court of the United States (2009)
2010
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010)
Elena Kagan – The Supreme Court of the United States (2010)
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010 (2010)
112th Congress                                                                                                                                 
2012
S.Amdt.1520 to the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (2012)
*Birth Control Exemption
S.Amdt.1537 to the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (2012)
*First Keystone Pipeline Approval
Middle Class Tax Cut Act (2012)
United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (2011)
113th Congress                                                                                                                                 
2013
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (2013)
S.Amdt.494 to S.Con.Res.8 (Fiscal Year 2014 Budget) (2013)
*Keystone Pipeline Funding
Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013 (2013)
2014
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Point-of-Order Vote on Patricia Ann Millett – The Judiciary (2013)
*Remove Cloture on All Nominations Except the Supreme Court
Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014)
114th Congress                                                                                                                                 
2015
Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act (2015)
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (2015)
2016
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (2015)
FAST Act (2015)
Every Student Succeeds Act (2015)
Iran Sanctions Extension Act (2016)
115th Congress                                                                                                                                 
2017
Elisabeth Prince DeVos – Department of Education (2017)
Neil M. Gorsuch – Supreme Court of the United States (2017)
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (2017)
S.Amdt.271 to the American Health Care Act of 2017 (2017)
*Repeal Affordable Care Act
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (2017)
2018
Brett M. Kavanaugh – Supreme Court of the United States (2018)
116th Congress                                                                                                                                 
2020
Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for High Crimes and
Misdemeanors (2020)
*Remove President Trump for Abuse of Power
Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for High Crimes and
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Misdemeanors (2020)
*Remove President Trump for Obstruction of Congress
CARES Act (2020)
Amy Coney Barrett – Supreme Court of the United States (2020)
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Appendix C: Bill Classifications
Bill CRS Classification My Classification










American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
Economics and Public
Finance Economic Policy
Children's Health Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2009 Health Social Policy
Appoint Sotomayor to U.S.S.C. Nomination
Executive
Nominations
Patient Protection and ACA Health Social Policy
Appoint Kagan to U.S.S.C. Nomination
Executive
Nominations
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2009 Commerce Social Policy
Middle Class Tax Cut Act Taxation Economic Policy
Birth Control Exemption
(S.Amdt.1520 to MAP-21) Health Social Policy








Public Works Social Policy
Keystone Pipeline Funding
(S.Amdt.494 to FY 2014 Budget)
Economics and Public
Finance Economic Policy
Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013 Taxation Economic Policy




Remove Cloture on Federal Positions Nomination
Executive
Nominations
Agriculture Bill of 2014 Agriculture and Food Social Policy
Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act Energy Social Policy






Every Student Succeeds Act Education Social Policy
FAST Act
Transportation and
Public Works Economic Policy
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of
2015 Health Social Policy
Iran Sanctions Extension Act International Affairs
Foreign Policy and
National Security
Appoint Gorsuch to U.S.S.C. Nomination
Executive
Nominations
Repeal Affordable Care Act
(S.Amdt.271 to American Health Care Act of 2017) Health Social Policy
Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act International Affairs
Foreign Policy and
National Security
Appoint DeVos as SoE Nomination
Executive
Nominations
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017
Economics and Public
Finance Economic Policy
Appoint Kavanaugh to U.S.S.C. Nomination
Executive
Nominations
Remove Trump for Abuse of Power Congress
Foreign Policy and
National Security
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